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Debt, Managerial Incentives and Learning
Abstract
Using a dynamic model with uncertainty and asymmetric information, we study the impact of debt on
managerial compensation and performance targets. In this model, compensation has two roles to play -
providing incentives to the manager and learning about his type. We show that debt acts as a substitute
of compensation in both dimensions. If uncertainty is not too low, the incentive role of debt dominates
the learning role. Thus in the presence of debt, compensation contracts can be more eﬀective in learning
about the manager. As debt increases, the pay-performance sensitivity falls and learning increases. We also
examine the choice of debt and derive conditions under which a positive level of debt is optimal. We also
conduct comparative statics with respect to the degree of asymmetric information and uncertainty.
JEL ClassiÞcation: D8, G32, J3
1 Introduction
The issues of managerial incentives and agency costs (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)) play an important
role in corporate Þnance. The traditional tool for aligning managerial interests with those of the owners has
been compensation contracts (For example, Holmstrom (1979,1999), Harris and Townsend (1981), Freixas,
Guesnerie and Tirole (1985), Murphy (1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992a),
Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), Meyer and Vickers (1997), Jeitschko and Mirman (2001) and Jeitschko, Mirman
and Salgueiro (JMS) (2001)). The Þnance literature has provided important insight into the role of capital
structure in providing incentives to the manager to act in the owners interest. For example, in a pioneering
paper, Jensen (1986) argues that debt may provide a useful tool to discipline managers by restricting the
amount of free cash ßow in their control (see also Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995)). In addition, it
is also well-known that managers incur pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs in bankruptcy states associated
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with debt. These eﬀects of debt on managerial payoﬀs suggest that managerial compensation contracts
should be diﬀerent with debt than without.
In this paper, we study the eﬀect of debt on managerial compensation contracts in a dynamic context.
That is, we ask how the compensation contract with debt compares with the compensation contract without
debt. In particular, is debt a substitute for compensation, implying for example that the presence of debt
leads to a lower compensation for a given performance level?1 If the contracts are repeated over time, what
eﬀect does debt have on managerial incentives? Further, if managerial abilities are unknown, how does debt
aﬀect the learning process? Finally, how do these eﬀects of debt on compensation feed back into the choice
of debt? In particular, if debt had no other beneÞts and costs, does its eﬀect on compensation justify a
positive debt level in equilibrium?
The dynamic aspect of the model allows us to study the eﬀect of debt on learning about the managers
ability/productivity (see Murphy (1986), Holmstrom (1999) and Jeitschko and Mirman (2001) on dynamics
of managerial incentives with hidden abilities). The motivation for studying hidden abilities and learning
is straightforward. Asymmetric information characterizes contractual relationships among various agents
participating in the Þrms activities and is at the heart of the agency theory. If adverse selection exists,
managers with superior abilities Þnd it easier to shirk or equivalently consume more perquisites if these
actions are unobservable and/or there is uncertainty in the outcomes2. Thus compensation contracts need
to address not only the problem of inducing the optimal eﬀort level for a manager with known ability but
also the problem of inducing the optimal eﬀort from the manager given that his ability is unknown. In this
paper, we concentrate on the latter problem in a dynamic setting.
In static models, the determination of equilibrium contracts takes the degree of asymmetry as given
whereas in dynamic models, learning and thus the degree of asymmetry of information becomes an important
1The relationship between leverage and compensation has received some attention in the empirical literature (for example,
Mehran (1992), Smith and Watts (1992)and Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997)). Overall, the results are inconclusive. Our
paper provides more insight, especially into the eﬀect of leverage on compensation, rather than the other way around.
2A recent paper (see Bernardo, Cai and Luo (2001)) examines managerial compensation in the context of capital budgeting,
using a model of adverse selection.
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part of the design of contracts. Whether learning occurs or not depends on whether information is valuable.
One beneÞt of learning is increased proÞts due to more eﬃcient economic decisions in the future. However,
it may be costly to learn since further incentives may have to be provided to the manager to reveal his type.
Thus in designing the optimal compensation contract, the principal often faces a trade-oﬀ between current
proÞts and future proÞts. We examine the eﬀect of debt on the degree of learning implicit in the design
of compensation contracts. The key driver of this eﬀect is bankruptcy associated with debt and the fact
that bankruptcy is costly to the manager. We assume uncertainty in the underlying environment in order to
allow for incomplete and slow learning, a more realistic scenario in our view. When there is no uncertainty, a
separating contract in the Þrst period reveals the type of the manager and thus learning is complete. On the
other hand, a pooling contract provides no information. Learning is a non-trivial issue when the underlying
environment is random and thus learning need not be complete and immediate.3
To be speciÞc, in this paper, we ask how debt aﬀects the short-term compensation contracts between
managers and owners when managers have private information about their productivity and get disutility
from expending eﬀort. We analyze how debt inßuences the key features of these contracts, in particular,
the pay-performance sensitivity and learning. We show that due to the cost of bankruptcy to the manager,
compensation is no longer needed as much to induce the good manager to reveal himself and produce the
desired output level. A positive probability of bankruptcy also implies that compensation is no longer needed
as much to learn about the managers type. Thus debt substitutes for compensation in both dimensions -
incentives and learning. We Þnd that in general, the overall eﬀect of debt on expected compensation and
learning depends on the level of debt, the degree of information asymmetry and uncertainty. However, if
uncertainty is not too low, the role of debt in substituting for incentives dominates the role in facilitating
learning. An implication of this result is that in the presence of debt, shareholders can use compensation con-
3Our paper is similar in spirit to Harris and Raviv (1990) in the sense that they also study the role of debt in learning about
the Þrm/manager and they also use debt as a disciplining device. However, the focus of our paper is new- we are interested in
the eﬀect of debt on the agency problem between shareholders and the manager, i.e., the extent to which debt and compensation
contracts substitute, whereas Harris and Ravis focus on the role of debt in making better operating decisions through generating
information about the Þrm. They do not address the eﬀect of debt on managerial compensation.
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tracts more eﬀectively to learn about the managers ability. Thus debt reduces the current pay-performance
sensitivity4 and increases learning. These eﬀects are stronger, the greater is the information asymmetry and
greater is the uncertainty. Thus an empirical prediction of our model is that Þrms with more debt have lower
current pay-performance sensitivity and that this relationship is stronger in Þrms facing more uncertainty in
their proÞts as well as more variance in the ability of the manager (Smith and Watts (1992) Þnd a negative
relationship between leverage and executive compensation.).
We also endogenize the debt level and Þnd that a positive level of debt is optimal, even abstracting from
other costs and beneÞts of debt, only if it is suﬃciently likely that the manager has high ability. Intuitively,
debt is a costly mechanism for providing incentives. However, we derive conditions under which optimal
debt exists. The key beneÞt of debt is the reduced compensation while the key disadvantage is the negative
eﬀect on learning due to lost future proÞts in the bankruptcy states. The dynamics plays an important role
in the existence of optimal debt. Indeed, in the static version, the optimal debt level must be zero. The
intuition is that in the static case, the shareholders bear the entire cost that debt inßicts on the manager
and thus there is no incentive eﬀect. At the same time, debt introduces distortions in performance targets.
In contrast, in the dynamic model, the incentive eﬀect of debt survives since debt lowers the probability of
future states in which mimicking is rewarded.
Comparative statics show that optimal level of debt increases with the productivity diﬀerential because
providing incentives becomes more important. The eﬀects of uncertainty and likelihood that the manager is
high-productivity are positive if optimal debt lies in the interior of allowable debt levels, otherwise negative.
We provide an example in which higher risk implies a lower optimal debt and thus higher pay-performance
sensitivity relative to low-risk Þrms, consistent with vast empirical evidence (e.g. see Bradley, Jarrell and
Kim (1984)), increases for moderate likelihood of high-productivity manager and decreases for high values
of this probability. More generally, this paper adds another dimension to the issue of weak pay-performance
4The notion of pay-performance sensitivity used here refers to change in average compensation of the manager as his average
performance changes.
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sensitivity (see Jensen and Murphy (1990)) since debt is shown to serve as a substitute for compensation.
Two recent papers address similar issues as in this paper. Berkovitch, Israel and Spiegel (2000)), while
allowing both moral hazard and unknown abilities, focus on a complementary problem, namely the eﬀect of
debt on managerial replacement and severance payments. Further, in their model, learning is complete and
compensation is determined through bargaining. Calcagno (2000) examines the eﬀect of debt on managerial
compensation under moral hazard but does not study unknown abilities and thus learning.
Our work is also similar to John and John (1993) and Brander and Poitevin (1992). These papers address
managerial decision making and compensation in the presence of debt, just as we do, but with a diﬀerent,
interesting focus. Both these papers show that managerial compensation contracts can be used to lower
agency costs of debt arising from the distorted investment decisions that debt induces shareholders to make
(see Green (1984)). Thus in both papers, hiring a manager and compensating him in a particular way is used
by shareholders as a commitment device towards the debtholders. In contrast, we study how shareholders
can use debt and compensation to provide incentives to the manager to exert the optimal eﬀort and reveal
his type. Grossman and Hart (1982) show that managers choose positive debt to commit to maximizing the
value of the Þrm. Although costly bankruptcy is a critical ingredient in their model just as in ours, the focus
of their paper is on the role of debt as a commitment device for managers, not the role of debt as a potential
tool for shareholders to substitute for compensation in providing incentives and learning about the manager.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) provide a general model of security design and managerial compensation.5
The model in this paper is closely related to JMS (2001). JMS examine a two-period model in which
the principal and agent enter into short-term compensation contracts under uncertainty and show that the
presence of uncertainty leads the principal to manipulate outputs and thus eﬀort targets of the manager in
the Þrst period in order to learn and provide incentives. We show that debt substitutes for compensation
5Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992b) study the impact of the managerial tendency to invest in relatively safe projects on the
choice of debt. However, they do not incorporate managerial compensation in the model. Hirshleifer and Suh (1992a) study
the trade-oﬀ between project risk and managerial eﬀort but do not incorporate debt.
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in both providing incentives and learning, leading to a rich set of comparative statics with respect to the
parameters of the model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present the model.; in section 3, we present
the second period problem; in section 4, we present the Þrst period problem with exogenous debt; in section
5, we present the Þrst-period problem with endogenous debt and Þnally, in section 6, we conclude. The
Appendix contains most proofs and examples.
2 MODEL
In this model, there is a single Þrm and two types of agents: the shareholders (the principal) and a manager
(the agent). There are two time periods. The Þrm produces output y in each period, using the eﬀort of
the manager chosen in each period. The output depends on the productivity of the manager and is subject
to a random shock, ε. A key feature of the model is that the manager has private information about his
productivity. Further, only the manager observes his eﬀort.
SpeciÞcally, output y is given by,
y = θe+ ε,
where θ is the productivity of the manager and e ∈ R+ is the eﬀort level chosen by him. θ takes two possible
values, θ < θ¯. The corresponding realization of output is y. The uninformed agents believe that θ is θ¯ with
probability ρ and θ with probability 1-ρ. We loosely refer to the high-productivity manager as a good
manager and the low productivity manager as bad. ε is distributed uniformly over the interval [-η,η],
η > 0, and independently over the two time periods.
The production requires assets in place worth K, to be Þnanced at the beginning of the game, either
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through equity alone or through equity and debt.6 The managers utility function is,
u = r − e2,
where r is the expected7 compensation received from shareholders. Thus the managers utility is linear
in compensation and eﬀort is costly for him. Further the marginal cost of eﬀort increases as eﬀort level
increases. Shareholders are risk-neutral and maximize the sum of expected proÞts over two periods net
of expected compensation and debt repayment, by choosing compensation contracts in each period. These
contracts satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints of the manager in each period.
Timing of Events
1. Date 0
Shareholders choose the debt level to Þnance assets to maximize the value of the Þrm. They also choose
the compensation plan for the two types of manager to maximize the value of equity. The manager
chooses the eﬀort level, given the compensation contract, to maximize his two-period expected utility.
2. Date 1
The output is realized and observed by all agents. If the output is suﬃcient, the debt is paid oﬀ
and then the managers compensation is paid. That is, the managers compensation is zero in the
bankruptcy states.
6The analysis is based on the assumption that the entire debt is to be repaid at the end of the Þrst period. Relaxing this
assumption adds unnecessary notation without changing the essence of the results because what drives the results is a positive
probability of bankruptcy at the end of the Þrst period. As long as this is a feature of the environment, any sequence of
repayments is consistent with the results.
7The focus of the paper is on the asymmetric information about the managers type. Therefore, instead of analyzing
compensation schedule, linking each realization of output with compensation, we study only the expected compensation for
each type. Similarly the performance target is an expected output level for each type. The expectation is taken with respect
to the distribution of ε.
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If the Þrm is solvent, the shareholders update their beliefs about the managers type using the obser-
vation of output.
If the Þrm is solvent, the production process is repeated, without any debt. Thus, the shareholders
choose the compensation contract for the second period to maximize the value of equity in the second
period and the manager chooses eﬀort, given the compensation contract, to maximize his expected
utility in the second period.
3. Date 2
Output of the second period is realized and the managers compensation is paid.
3 Solving the Model: The Second-Period Problem
We solve the model recursively, starting with the second period. Assuming that the two types of manager
choose a distinct eﬀort level, that is, the contract in the Þrst period is separating, the distributions of the
output corresponding to the two eﬀort levels either overlap partly or are completely disjoint, due to the
uniform density of the shock, ε. That is, the publicly observed realization of output, y, either reveals the
type of the manager or does not provide any information about the type. This implies that the posterior
belief of the uninformed agents about the type of the manager being high-productivity is either 1 or 0 or ρ.
A suﬃciently large value of η ensures that there is a non-empty region of output realizations in which no
information is revealed about the type of the manager. (See JMS).
Let y denote the expected output corresponding to the eﬀort level chosen by the low-productivity manager
and let y¯ be the expected output corresponding to the eﬀort level chosen by the high-productivity manager.
The shareholders believe that the output realization lies in [ y − η,y + η ] conditional on the belief that
the managers productivity is low and it lies in [y¯ − η, y¯ + η], conditional on the belief that the managers
productivity is high. If η is suﬃciently large, we have the following posterior distribution.
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ρ2 =

0, if y ∈ (y − η, y¯ − η)
ρ, if y ∈ (y¯ − η, y + η)
1, if y ∈ (y + η, y¯ + η)
The probability distribution of ρ2 then is,
Probability that ρ2 =

0, is (1− ρ) y¯−y2η
ρ, is
2η−y¯+y
2η
1, is ρ
y¯−y
2η
Let D denote the face value of debt, owed at date1. The realized output can lie in either of the three
intervals mentioned above. Since D is chosen at date 0, the managers choice of output targets determines
which interval D falls in. We focus on the parameter values for which D lies in the interval, (Max (y −
η, 0), y¯− η), denoting it by I1.8 The key implication of this assumption is that there is a positive probability
of bankruptcy if and only if the managers productivity is low.
We analyze the eﬀect of debt on the compensation contract, which is deÞned as ((y¯, r¯), (y, r)), where y¯
and y are as deÞned earlier and r¯ and r are the corresponding expected compensation to the manager of each
type, conditional on solvency. In particular, we analyze the eﬀect of debt on pay-performance sensitivity
deÞned in our setting as the ratio of change in total expected compensation to change in the expected output.
If the realized output at the end of the Þrst period is such that ρ2 = 0 or 1, that is, the type of the
manager is revealed, the proÞt-maximizing contract for the shareholders in the second period must specify
the Þrst-best outputs and zero surplus to both types of the manager. On the other hand, if ρ2 = ρ, the
shareholders obtain no information from the Þrst-period contract and thus maximize their second-period
8The essence of the analysis is the same if D were to lie in the other intervals although the speciÞc results are naturally
diﬀerent.
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expected proÞts subject to the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Since this is
a standard agency problem (see Harris and Townsend (1981)), we skip the details and simply report the
maximized expected proÞts, denoted by A.
From now on, we set θ = 1, without loss of generality and replace θ¯ by θ. Thus using the probability
distribution of ρ2, and adjusting it for debt owed, the expected second-period proÞts of the shareholders are,
V (D, y, y¯) = (1− ρ) y¯ − η −D
8η
+ ρ
y¯ − y
8η
θ2 +
2η − y¯ + y
2η
A, (1)
where,
A = ρ
θ2
4
+
Ã
(1− ρ)
2
¡
1− ρ
θ2
¢!2µ1− 2ρ
θ2
¶
. (2)
Note that A is independent of the Þrst period outputs as well as η.
In the next section, we examine the impact of given debt on the Þrst period equilibrium outputs, com-
pensation and learning.
4 The First-Period Problem: Exogenous Debt
The Þrst-period maximization problem of the shareholders is to maximize the sum of the two-period proÞts
by choosing the Þrst-period outputs and rewards, given the debt level and given the eﬀect of these choices
on the expected second-period proÞts, subject to the managers individual rationality (IR) constraint and
the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. Intuitively, in setting the compensation contract variables, the
principal faces a trade-oﬀ between current and future proÞts. The closer are the target output levels in the
Þrst period, the higher are the current proÞts due to a smaller ratchet eﬀect payment to the good manager
but lower are the future proÞts due to less learning. As noted above, learning enables the principal to extract
all proÞts above the reservation utility level, in the second period. We examine the eﬀect of debt on this
trade-oﬀ.
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The two-period maximization problem of the shareholders is to choose y, y¯, r and r¯ in the Þrst period to
maximize,
(1− ρ)
Ã
(y + η −D)2
4η
− y + η −D
2η
r
!
+ ρ (y¯ −D − r¯) + V (D, y, y¯),
subject to,
y + η −D
2η
r ≥ y2, r¯ ≥ y¯
2
θ2
,
y + η −D
2η
r − y2 ≥ r¯ − y¯2,
r¯ − y¯
2
θ2
≥ y + η −D
2η
r − y
2
θ2
+
y¯ − η −D
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶
.
The Þrst two inequalities are the IR constraints and the last two inequalities are the IC constraints. In
the event that the managerproductivity is low, the shareholders make no proÞts due to a positive probability
of bankruptcy. In the event of solvency, they get the residual, that is, the realized proÞt net of the debt
owed and the expected compensation, r. Note that r denotes expected compensation conditional on solvency
consistent with our assumption that the debtholders have priority in payment. The IR constraint of the low-
productivity manager reßects the fact that in the event of bankruptcy, he gets no compensation. Thus for
the low-productivity manager to accept the compensation contract, the compensation in the solvency states
must be higher than in the absence of debt. That is, the cost of bankruptcy to the low-productivity manager
is borne by the shareholders. Recall that by assumption (that D∈ I1), the probability of bankruptcy is zero
if the manager is good.
The IC constraint of the high-productivity manager reßects the fact that deviating from the prescribed
output target leads to a positive probability of bankruptcy and thus a lower gain in the future. This,
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especially the last term of the IC constraint of the good manager, is a key ingredient in results of this paper.
This term measures the ratchet eﬀect (see Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985))- the up-front payment
needed in a dynamic contracting environment to induce the good manager to reveal himself. In the absence
of this payment, the good manager has an incentive to mimic the bad manager because doing so implies
that there is a positive probability that he is perceived to be the bad manager in the second period. In that
event, the good manager gets positive utility in the second period compared to zero utility from revealing
himself. Due to the positive probability of bankruptcy brought about by debt, this term is lower than in the
absence of debt, other things being equal. That is, given the Þrst period outputs, a lower up-front payment
is needed in the presence of debt.
4.1 Analysis
We assume that the IC constraint binds only for the high-productivity manager and the IR constraint
binds only for the low-productivity manager and verify these later. The binding IC constraint for the
high-productivity manager and the binding IR constraint for the low-productivity manager together imply
that in a static model, debt provides no incentives to the high-productivity manager since the shareholders
compensate the manager for the bankruptcy cost.
Substituting for y and y¯ from the binding constraints and for the value function from equation 1 into the
proÞt function, we obtain,
Πd ≡ ρ
Ã
y¯ −D − y¯
2
θ2
− y2 + y
2
θ2
− y¯ − η −D
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶!
+
(1− ρ)
Ã
(y + η −D)2
4η
− y2
!
+
(1− ρ) y¯ − η −D
8η
+ ρ
y¯ − y
8η
θ2 +
2η − y¯ + y
2η
A. (3)
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Note that debt has two types of eﬀects on proÞts. One is due to bankruptcy and the other is regardless
of bankruptcy. The latter leads to a transfer of a Þxed payment from shareholders to debtholders, and thus
has no eﬀect on Þrm value. Bankruptcy however changes the compensation contract, including the proÞt-
maximizing output targets. If there were no bankruptcy, debt would have no eﬀect on the compensation
contract in this model. In what follows, we refer to the bankruptcy-induced eﬀect of debt, rather than the
transfer of D as such. For purposes of comparison, the proÞt function for the no-debt case is as follows9.
Π ≡ ρ
Ã
y¯ − y¯
2
θ2
− y2 + y
2
θ2
− y¯ − y
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶!
+
(1− ρ) ¡y − y2¢+ (1− ρ) y¯ − y
8η
+ ρ
y¯ − y
8η
θ2 +
2η − y¯ + y
2η
A. (4)
Comparing equation (3) and (4) reveals Þrst, that the ratchet eﬀect terms are diﬀerent, as discussed
earlier. Second, the expected proÞts in the second period are diﬀerent due to the probability of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy not only aﬀects the proÞts realized at the end of the Þrst period but also the proÞts realized at
the end of the second period. This is because if bankruptcy occurs, the Þrm is liquidated at the end of the
Þrst period. Although this eﬀect is induced by the event of bankruptcy, it has an important implication for
shareholders incentive to learn about the managerial type. In the no-debt case, the shareholders have an
incentive to learn, that is, they have the incentive to set Þrst period outputs in such a way that the manager
reveals himself with a positive probability. This increases the second period proÞts of the bank since the
Þrst-best outcome can be achieved in the full-revelation states. With debt, some proÞts from learning are
lost. In what follows, we analyze how debt aﬀects compensation and learning by examining the properties
of equilibrium of the model.
9The derivation is similar to the case when there is debt.
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Let y∗, y¯∗ denote the solutions of the no-debt problem, that is the Þrst-period outputs implied by the
optimal contract of the no-debt problem.
Proposition 1
y¯d = y¯
∗
and
y
d
=
(1− ρ)( η−D2η )− ρθ
2
8η +
A
2η
2[1− ρ
θ2
]− 1−ρ2η
. (5)
Proof. The Þrst order condition with respect to y¯ is,
dΠd
dy¯
= ρ
µ
1− 2y¯ 1
θ2
− 1
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶¶
+
1− ρ
8η
+ ρ
1
8η
θ2 − A
2η
= 0.
This reduces to,
y¯d =
θ2
2
µ
1− 1
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶
+
1
8ηρ
¡
1− ρ+ ρθ2 − 4A¢¶ = y¯∗. (6)
Similarly the Þrst order condition with respect to y is,
(1− ρ)
µ
y + η −D
2η
− 2y
¶
+ ρ
µ
−2y + 2y
θ2
¶
− ρ 1
8η
θ2 +
1
2η
A = 0. (7)
Solving for y gives us the result.
The second order condition of the maximization problem requires that,
η >
1− ρ
4(1− ρ
θ2
)
.
For later use, the lower output target without debt is,
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y∗ =
(8η − 1)(1− ρ)− ρ[ 1
θ2
− 1] + 4A− ρθ2
16η
¡
1− ρ
θ2
¢ . (8)
Other conditions are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium in I1. SpeciÞcally, the analysis above
assumes that max
³
0, y
d
− η
´
< D < y¯d − η < yd+ η. This set of inequalities imposes further conditions
on the parameters of the model, η, ρ and θ. Example 1 in the Appendix shows that there are parameter
values for which equilibrium exists.10 It can also be veriÞed that the IR constraint of the good manager
is satisÞed in equilibrium. The IC constraint of the low-productivity manager is satisÞed in equilibrium if
y¯d + yd > 1.We conÞne the analysis to parameters for which this condition is met. In particular, Example 1
in the Appendix satisÞes this condition. The following corollary of Proposition 1 follows.
Corollary 1 As debt increases within I1, (i) yd falls, (ii) the Þrst-period expected compensation of the
manager falls, (iii) learning increases and (iv) the pay-performance sensitivity declines.
Proof. Part (i) follows from 5. For part (ii), the expected compensation of the low-productivity manager
is given by y2, by his binding IR constraint. Since y
d
falls as D increases, the expected compensation
decreases with D. For the high-productivity manager, we combine his binding IC constraint with the binding
IR constraint of the low-productivity manager and obtain,
r¯ =
y¯2
θ2
+ y2
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶
+
y¯ − η −D
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶
. (9)
Since y falls as D increases, the second term falls. The third term obviously falls with D. Thus r¯ decreases as
D increases. Part (iii) follows from the fact that as debt increases, the distance between the two Þrst-period
output targets increases.
For part (iv), deÞne pay-performance sensitivity as
r− y+η−D2η r
y−y , that is, the change in expected compen-
10 Interestingly, in the absence of debt, the only condition needed for existence of equilibrium is that η be suﬃciently large.
Thus debt changes the model signiÞcantly.
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sation as expected performance changes. Thus,
r − y+η−D2η r
y − y =
y + y
θ2
+
y¯ − η −D
8η(y − y)
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶
(10)
Since y falls as D increases and y remains unchanged, it follows that this ratio falls as debt increases within
the Þrst interval.
Intuitively, as debt increases within interval I1, the probability of bankruptcy increases, implying a
lower marginal beneÞt to the shareholders from increasing y and thus y decreases. An implication of this
corollary is that as debt increases, the expected compensation of the good manager decreases on two accounts
(see equation (9)): the ratchet eﬀect component (attributable to the dynamic game) goes down due to a
higher debt and second, the reduction in the low-productivity managers target output reduces the rent
(attributable to the static game) to the good manager. The expected compensation of the low-productivity
manager obviously falls. Finally, a higher debt implies more learning since outputs are set further apart due
to a higher probability of bankruptcy. The intuition behind the decline in pay-performance sensitivity is
simply that an increase in debt increases the probability of bankruptcy for the low type and thus reduces
the future states in which the high type beneÞts from mimicking. Thus debt substitutes for compensation
and reduces the sensitivity of current pay to performance.
4.2 Comparing y
d
and y∗
Note that Corollary 1 does not take into account all eﬀects of debt and thus does not imply that the lower
performance target with debt is lower than the lower target without debt. That is, it does not imply that
y
d
< y∗. Intuitively, this comparison must also account for how debt aﬀects the ratchet eﬀect payment
and future proÞts. These eﬀects are one-time eﬀects in the sense that they occur once, as the shareholders
move their debt level from zero to a positive amount within interval I1 and do not occur as D varies within
this interval. A comparison of y
d
and y∗ is critical to account for all eﬀects of debt, unlike the partial eﬀect
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captured in the corollary. For this purpose, we analyze the Þrst order conditions that determine the optimum
levels of these two lower targets.
dΠd
dy
= (1− ρ)
µ
y + η −D
2η
− 2y
¶
+ ρ
µ
−2y + 2y
θ2
¶
− ρ 1
8η
θ2 +
1
2η
A,
dΠ
dy
= (1− ρ) ¡1− 2y¢+ ρµ−2y + 2y
θ2
+
1
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶¶
− 1− ρ
8η
− ρ 1
8η
θ2 +
1
2η
A, (11)
dΠd
dy
− dΠ
dy
= (1− ρ)
µ
y + η −D
2η
− 1
¶
+
−ρ
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶
+
1− ρ
8η
. (12)
The Þrst term in Equation (12) represents the diﬀerential marginal eﬀect of y on current proÞts when
the manager has low productivity. This is the bankruptcy eﬀect of debt. The second term represents the
diﬀerential marginal eﬀect of y on the ratchet eﬀect payment that the high-productivity manager requires in
a separating equilibrium. We refer to it as the incentive eﬀect of debt since this term inßuences the managers
incentive to mimic. Finally, the third term represents the diﬀerential marginal eﬀect on future proÞts of y.
We refer to this as the learning eﬀect of debt.
Now clearly the second term is negative and the third term is positive. The Þrst term is also negative
since D is greater than y−η, by assumption. Intuitively, when debt is in I1, increasing y has a smaller positive
eﬀect on current proÞts because some proÞts are lost in bankruptcy anyway. Interestingly, debt takes away
the positive eﬀect of increasing y in reducing the ratchet eﬀect payment. In the absence of debt, increasing
y reduces the up-front payment because it reduces the probability that the good manager is perceived to
be the bad manager. However with debt, the set of states in which the good manager is perceived to be
the bad manager does not change on the margin, as y changes and thus y has no marginal eﬀect on the
probability of being perceived as the bad manager. Finally, debt also takes away the negative eﬀect of y on
future proÞts. In the zero-debt case, increasing y lowers the probability of complete learning and thus lowers
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expected proÞts. However, with debt, the bankruptcy states are irrelevant to shareholders and thus on the
margin, increasing y does not reduce future proÞts as much.
Thus debt has an important bearing on both incentives and learning implied by the compensation con-
tract. The incentive eﬀect of debt, through the ratchet eﬀect, implies that, ceteris paribus, the Þrst-period
output targets are set further apart with debt. By Equation (9), it follows that the expected compensation
is lower, ceteris paribus. In this sense, debt acts as a substitute for compensation in providing incentives.
However, debt also acts as a substitute for compensation in learning about the manager. That is, how
the good manager is compensated in the Þrst period has a smaller marginal eﬀect on the future proÞts of
shareholders. Thus the Þrst period outputs can be set closer together with debt. By Equation (9), it follows
that the expected compensation of the good manager is higher with debt, ceteris paribus. Thus, the two
eﬀects of debt on compensation go in opposite direction and the net result depends on the fundamentals
of the environment, namely, the likelihood of the manager being high-productivity (ρ), the importance of
asymmetric information (θ) and the extent of uncertainty (η), as well as the amount of debt (D).
We next examine how these opposite eﬀects of debt on incentives and learning are resolved.
Proposition 2 y
d
< y∗ if and only if
D > D ≡Max[0, y∗ − η − 1
4
µ
ρ
1− ρ(1−
1
θ2
)− 1
¶
]. (13)
Proof. Proof follows by evaluating Equation (12) at y = y∗, setting it to be less than 0 and then solving
for D.
Corollary 2 If D >Max (0,y∗ − η), a suﬃcient condition for y
d
< y∗ is
ρ >
1
2− 1
θ2
. (14)
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Proof is obvious.
Equation (14) implies that when ρ is large, debt substitutes for compensation more in providing in-
centives than in learning and thus outputs of the two types of manager are set further apart with debt
than without to maximize learning.11 Intuitively, the substitution for the incentive-role of compensation
is stronger since it is more likely that the manager has high productivity and thus reducing the up-front
payment to the good manager is more important than maximizing proÞts from the low-productivity manager
in the future.
We now present some economic implications of Proposition 2, that are similar in essence to Corollary 1.
Corollary 3 (Eﬀect on Learning) For all D>D, debt leads to higher learning.
Proof. The distance between expected outputs increases due to debt and thus learning increases.
So far, the discussion has been in terms of output targets rather than eﬀort targets but given that y and
y¯ are simply e
¯
and θe¯ respectively, the eﬀect of debt on eﬀort levels is straightforward.
Corollary 4 (Eﬀect on Eﬀort) For all D>D, debt leads to lower eﬀort by the low-productivity manager.
Debt leads to the same eﬀort for the high-productivity manager for all D ∈ I1.
Proof follows from the production function and Proposition 2.
Corollary 5 (Eﬀect of debt on compensation) For all D>D, debt leads to lower expected compensation for
both types of manager.
Proof. For the low-type manager, the proof is obvious since by the individual rationality constraint,
his expected compensation equals y2
d
, which has been shown to be lower. The expected compensation of
the high type with debt is given by Equation (9). In comparison, the expected compensation without debt
11 It may seem puzzling at Þrst glance that debt increases learning even though its role in substituting for learning is less
important than in providing incentives. It is in fact quite intuitive. Compensation in the absence of debt needs to address
incentives as well as learning. Debt substitutes for the incentive role, thus leaving the compensation contract to focus more on
learning.
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= y¯
∗2
θ2
+ y∗2
¡
1− 1
θ2
¢
+
y¯∗−y∗
8η
¡
1− 1
θ2
¢
.In these two expressions of expected compensation, the Þrst term
is identical, the second term is lower with debt and Þnally the third term is also lower with debt since D
>D⇒ D > y∗ − η.
Corollary 6 For all D>D, debt lowers the pay-performance sensitivity.
Proof. Since y
d
< y∗, for all D>D, the same logic applies as in Corollary 1, part (iv).
Thus, these corollaries imply that if debt is above a cutoﬀ level, learning increases, expected compen-
sation of both types of manager falls and the pay-performance sensitivity falls. Thus debt substitutes for
compensation in providing incentives. The following Proposition shows that the cut-oﬀ level is non-binding
if the uncertainty is not too low.
Proposition 3 ∀ η > 0.75,D = 0.
For Proof, see the Appendix.
Intuitively, y∗ is small relative to η, for all η > 0.75. Thus, if η is suﬃciently high, for all allowable debt
levels, the lower target output, y
d
, falls and thus expected compensation of both types of manager falls and
learning increases.12
Corollary 7 ∀ η > 0.75, debt decreases the Þrst-period expected compensation of both types of manager,
increases learning and reduces the Þrst-period pay-performance sensitivity.
Thus far we have assumed that debt level is exogenously given to be in I1 and examined its eﬀect on
compensation and learning, restricting output targets such that debt indeed lies in I1. We next determine
the optimal level of debt and show that the analysis thus far is non-vacuuous since there exist parameter
12We can show that even for small values of η, except for θ close to 1, the cut-oﬀ level of debt is zero, implying that debt
leads to lower expected compensation and higher learning for all values of parameters, except when θ is close to 1 and η is
small. However the proof is quite tedious and does not add much to the insights already obtained.
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values for which optimal debt level indeed lies in I1 and further, that debt increases value of the Þrm. We
also conduct comparative statics with respect to ρ, θ and η.
5 The First-Period Problem: Endogenous Debt
We assume that the decision on Þnancing the assets in place is made by the shareholders to maximize the
value of the Þrm as a whole rather than only equity.13 Thus the maximization problem of the shareholders
is to choose D at date 0 to maximize, (We omit the subscript d on the lower output for convenience.).
ρ
Ã
y¯ −D − y¯
2
θ2
− y2 + y
2
θ2
− y¯ − η −D
8η
µ
1− 1
θ2
¶!
+(1− ρ)
Ã
(y + η −D)2
4η
− y2
!
+(1− ρ) y¯ − η −D
8η
+ ρ
y¯ − y
8η
θ2 +
2η − y¯ + y
2η
A
+
1− ρ
2η
"Z D
y−η
ydy +
Z y+η
D
Ddy
#
+ ρD.
The last row represents the value of debt14 and the remaining terms represent the value of equity. Due
to the envelope theorem, only the direct eﬀect of D on the value of equity needs to be considered. However,
since the compensation scheme does not take into account the value of debt, we must consider the direct as
well as the indirect (through y) eﬀect of D on the value of debt.
The Þrst order condition with respect to D is,
13Note that if D were chosen to maximize the value of equity, a positive level of D would not arise because a positive D
implies a transfer from equityholders to debtholders. This transfer outweighs any positive eﬀects of D.
14Note that the debtholders own the Þrm if output is less than D. If the lowest realization of output is negative, the expression
for value of debt suggests that they bear the loss. While this may seem unrealistic, it is simply a normalization. In particular,
one can shift the support of output to the right without aﬀecting the results.
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1− ρ
2η
(D − (y − η)) dy
dD
+ ρ
1
8η
(1− 1
θ2
)− (1− ρ) 1
8η
= 0. (15)
By Corollary 1,
dy
dD < 0, and thus the second order condition for maximization is satisÞed. The Þrst term
in the above derivative captures the indirect eﬀect of debt on the value of debt, the second term captures
the direct eﬀect of debt on managerial incentives through the ratchet eﬀect and the last term captures the
direct eﬀect of debt on the second period proÞts. The Þrst term of equation (15) is negative for all D in I1
- debt lowers the lower output target which reduces the value of debt. The second term of the derivative
(reßecting the direct incentive eﬀect of debt) is positive. Thus debt alleviates the managerial incentive
problems. Finally, the last term of the derivative, reßecting the direct eﬀect of debt on future proÞts, is
negative. That is, debt, due to bankruptcy, reduces future proÞts from learning. Thus a necessary condition
for debt to emerge in our model is that the incentive eﬀect dominates the learning eﬀect.15
Proposition 4 A necessary condition for debt to emerge in the dynamic model is that the positive direct
eﬀect of debt on incentives dominate the negative direct eﬀect of debt on learning and future proÞts. That is,
ρ >
1
2− 1
θ2
. (16)
This condition is also suﬃcient for optimal debt to be in I1, if y − η > 0.
Proof. The necessity part follows from the fact that the Þrst term is negative. The suﬃciency follows
from the fact that if to the contrary, D∗ ≤ y − η, the derivative with respect to D is positive.
Thus optimal debt is positive only if the probability of high-productivity manager is suﬃciently high. This
is intuitive since bankruptcy is costly - the Þrm is liquidated even when on average, it is worth continuing.
Thus debt is a costly mechanism for providing incentives to the manager. However, if the manager is much
15Note that the equilibrium level of debt must be zero in the static model since only the Þrst term of the Þrst order condition
remains and this term is negative. Thus debt is a deadweight loss in the static model.
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more likely to have high productivity, the future loss from shutting the Þrm down is outweighed by the
reduced compensation in the Þrst period.16 This condition is also suﬃcient to lead to a positive amount of
debt if the Þrm never makes a loss. In this case, there is a beneÞt from increasing debt until the negative
eﬀect of debt on current value of the Þrm oﬀsets the net positive incentive eﬀect of debt. In contrast, if the
lowest realized output is negative, zero debt may be optimal, due to relatively stronger negative eﬀect of
distorted lower target on the value of debt.
For derivation of the optimal debt level, denoted by D∗, it is convenient to let (see Equation (5)) y
d
=
α− βD so that dydD = −β,α > 0,β > 0. If an interior solution for debt exists, it is obtained by simplifying
(15):
Di =
1
1 + β
Ã
α− η +
ρ
1−ρ(1− 1θ2 )− 1
4β
!
. (17)
To be consistent with our assumption that D∈ I1, D∗ must satisfy y¯−η ≥ D∗ >Max(0, yd−η) =Max(0,α−
βD − η). That is,
0 < D∗ =Min
¡
Di, y¯ − η¢ . (18)
The equality is tedious to characterize. However, an example is provided in the appendix where this set of
inequalities is indeed satisÞed and the optimal level of debt increases the value of the Þrm.
Next, we analyze how optimal debt level varies with the underlying parameters.
Proposition 5 (i) dD
∗
dρ > 0 iﬀ D = D
i. (ii) dD
∗
dθ > 0.(iii)
dD∗
dη > 0 iﬀ D = D
i.
For proof, see the Appendix.
Intuitively, as ρ increases, the positive eﬀect of debt in alleviating incentives becomes stronger. Thus if
the debt level werent already the maximum consistent with positive probability of bankruptcy only for the
16Clearly, allowing for a liquidation value in the event of bankruptcy only strengthens our results.
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low-type, that is, if there is room to increase debt, it is increased. However, the maximum level goes down
as ρ increases because the marginal future beneÞt from increasing y¯ falls for all ρ satisfying the necessary
condition (given by equation (16)) while the marginal cost (current compensation) increases. Example 3a
in the Appendix shows that the upper bound on optimal debt binds as ρ increases. Thus optimal debt level
increases for intermediate values of ρ and decreases for high values of ρ. An empirical implication of this
result is that Þrms or industries in which the probability of the manager being high-ability is moderately
(signiÞcantly) higher, borrow more (less) and thus have lower (higher) pay-performance sensitivity and higher
(lower) learning.
As θ increases, the optimal level of debt increases unambiguously since providing incentives becomes
more important. The upper bound on debt increases as well since unlike ρ, an increase in θ lowers current
compensation and this eﬀect outweighs the decrease in the future marginal beneÞt. The empirical prediction
of this result is that Þrms or industries in which the managerial productivity diﬀerential is large, borrow
more in equilibrium and thus have a lower pay-performance sensitivity and higher learning.
Finally, an increase in η increases optimal debt if there is room to do so, that is, if the optimal debt
remains in the interior of the feasible range. Intuitively, this is because as η increases, the marginal eﬀect of
debt on the lower target, measured by β, decreases, implying that the negative marginal eﬀect of debt on the
value of debt is weaker. However, the upper bound on the debt level falls as η increases. Example 3c (in the
Appendix) shows that optimal debt decreases as η increases for all η consistent with existence of equilibrium.
This is consistent with empirical evidence since a higher η in our setting implies a higher variance of output,
keeping the mean constant. The empirical literature shows that high-risk Þrms are associated with lower
debt. Combining it with Proposition 3 and Corollaries of Proposition 2 imply that riskier Þrms have higher
pay-performance sensitivity and lower learning, ceteris paribus.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of debt, managerial incentives and learning in a dynamic context.
We have shown that when the manager has private information about his productivity and his eﬀort, due
to the threat of bankruptcy, debt serves as a substitute of compensation in both providing incentives as
well as learning about the managers type. We have determined conditions under which debt reduces the
pay-performance sensitivity and increases learning. In particular, these results hold if uncertainty is not too
low. Further, the more likely it is that the manager is good and/or the higher the productivity of the good
manager, the greater is the role of debt in providing incentives and weaker is the role of debt in facilitating
learning. We have also determined conditions under which optimal debt increases value of the Þrm through
its eﬀect on managerial compensation even abstracting from all other costs and beneÞts of debt. Finally,
illustrations of comparative statics show that optimal debt decreases with uncertainty, increases in the
managers productivity, increases for intermediate values of the probability of a good manager and decreases
for higher values of the probability.
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Appendix
Example 1 (Existence of Equilibrium) Suppose θ = 4, ρ = 0.7⇒ A = 2.8225.
The existence condition for no-debt case are y¯∗ > y∗ and y¯∗−η < y∗+η. Substituting for the parameters
into the expressions for y∗ (Equation (8)) and y¯∗(Equation (6)), existence of equilibrium requires η >Max
(0.085, 3.8346).
For D∈ I1, the following conditions are required for existence of equilibrium in the presence of debt:
1. y¯d − η < yd + η ⇒ 8 − 0.6375η − η <
0.45−0.3Dη + 0.022 5η
1. 912 5− 0.3η
+ η, after substituting in the parameter values
assumed for θ and ρ, into (5) and (6).
2. D >Max(0, yd − η).
3. D < y¯d − η ⇒ D < 8− 0.637 5η − η
Note that condition (3) requires that η be bounded above by y¯d. Further y¯d ↑ 8 as η increases. Thus,
combining the existence condition for the no-debt case with condition 3, 3.8346 < η < 8. We illustrate our
results by setting η = 4. Since, yd − η < 0⇒Max(0, yd− η) = 0⇒ D > 0. Thus the non-empty interval for
D is (0, 3.84).
Proof. (Proposition 3) This result follows by noting Þrst that the last term in equation (13) is less
than 14 . Second, y
∗ is bounded above by 12 , the Þrst-best output for the low-productivity manager. This is
because increasing y∗ above 12 decreases proÞts from the low-type manager as well as the high-type manager.
At the same time, increasing y∗ decreases future proÞts because it lowers learning. Thus η − y∗ > 14 for all
η > 0.75⇒ D = 0.
Example 2 (Optimal Debt): Suppose θ = 4, ρ = 0.7, A = 2.8225, η = 4, as in Example 1 above. Note
that the values of ρ and θ satisfy the necessary condition for existence of debt, given by equation (16).
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At given parameter values, by (5), y
d
= 8. 149 9× 10−2 − 0.02D. It follows from (17) that
Di = 10. 711 /∈ (0, 3.84), required for existence of equilibrium (see (18)). Thus D∗ = 3.84.
y
d
= 0.0047, y∗ = 0.164 15 and y¯∗ = 7.84.
Total proÞts with debt = 5. 6495, Total proÞts without debt =5. 5378.Thus debt increases the value of
the Þrm.
Proof. (Proposition 5) First, we examine how Di varies with the three parameters. The Þrst order
condition with respect to D (see Equation (15)) makes it clear that as ρ increases, the last two terms
increase. We Þnd that if Di is held Þxed, the Þrst term also increases as ρ increases (details are tedious
and thus omitted.). Thus dD
i
dρ > 0. Next, as θ increases, the incentive eﬀect of debt becomes stronger (the
second term in (15) increases) while the learning eﬀect remains unchanged. Similar to ρ, as θ increases, the
Þrst term increases as well. Thus dD
i
dθ > 0. Finally, as η increases, the net incentive eﬀect becomes smaller.
However, the Þrst term increases, meaning that the negative eﬀect of bankruptcy is smaller too. The overall
eﬀect of an increase in η on Di is positive. Next, we examine the properties of the upper bound on D,
namely, y¯ − η.
(i) First, we show that dy¯
∗
dρ < 0, thus implying
dD∗
dρ > 0 iﬀ D
∗ = Di.
dy¯∗
dρ
= − θ
2
16ηρ
[4
dA
dρ
− 4A− 1
ρ
] < 0iff4
dA
dρ
− 4A− 1
ρ
> 0.
Substituting for A from equation (2) yields dy¯
∗
dρ < 0 iﬀ θ
2 > 1−ρ
2
2(1−ρ) . This inequality holds for all ρ ∈ [0, 1]
and θ > 1.Hence, dD
∗
dρ > 0 if D
∗ = Di, dD
∗
dρ < 0 if D
∗ = y¯ − η.
(ii) We now show that dy¯
∗
dθ > 0, thus implying
dD∗
dθ > 0.
30
dy¯∗
dθ
= θ +
θ
8η
(
1
ρ
− 1) + θ
8ηρ
µ
ρ(2θ2 − 1) + 4(θdA
dθ
−A)
¶
.
Now
dA
dθ
=
ρθ
2
+
(1− ρ)2ρ
θ3
¡
1− ρ
θ2
¢3 µρ(1− ρθ2 )(2− ρ) + ρθ2 (1− ρ)2
¶
.
Substituting for dAdθ and A into
dy¯∗
dθ yields,
dy¯∗
dθ = θ +
θ
8η (
1
ρ − 1)+
θ
8η
µ
3θ2 − 1 + (1−ρ)2
(1− ρ
θ2
)3
¡
1
θ2
¡¡
6− (1− ρ)2¢− 1¢ (1− ρ
θ2
) + ρ
θ4
(1− ρ)2¢¶
> 0, since θ > 1.
(iii) Finally, we show that dy¯dη − η < 0, for all ρ satisfying (16) and for all η such that
y∗ + η > y¯ − η > 0. Thus dD∗dη > 0 iﬀ D∗ = Di.
dy¯
dη
− η = θ
2
16η2
µ
1− 1
θ2
+
1
ρ
¡−1 + ρ− ρθ2 + 4A¢¶− 1 < 0
iff 1− 1
θ2
+
1
ρ
¡−1 + ρ− ρθ2 + 4A¢ < 16η2
θ2
.
⇒ 1− 1
θ2
+ (−1
ρ
+ 1 +
(1− ρ)2¡
1− ρ
θ2
¢2 µ1ρ − 2θ2
¶
) <
16η2
θ2
,
⇒ 2− 1
θ2
− (1− ρ)
2¡
1− ρ
θ2
¢2 2θ2 − 1ρ
Ã
1− (1− ρ)
2¡
1− ρ
θ2
¢2
!
<
16η2
θ2
.
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This inequality holds for all ρ satisfying (16) and for all η such that y¯ − η > 0.
Example 3 Comparative Statics Illustrations
a. Changes in ρ : Recall that 0 < D∗ =Min
¡
Di, y¯ − η¢ .
Let η = 5 and θ = 4. Substituting in A yields, A = 4ρ+ (1−ρ)
2
(2− 18ρ)
2
¡
1− 18ρ
¢
. Substituting these values in
Di yields the solid curve in the diagram. And substituting the same values in y¯d − η, yields the dashed
curve. Thus for ρ ∈ (0.6013, 0.6323), D*=Di and increases as ρ increases. For ρ > 0.6323, D* = y¯d − η and
falls as ρ increases. The fall in y¯d − η, is clearer in the second panel, with the scale adjusted.
The value of Di increases signiÞcantly as ρ approaches 1. For the sake of comparison with the upper
bound on debt, given by y¯ − η, we do not show the higher values of ρ in this diagram.
Eﬀect of Changes in ρ on D∗ Eﬀect of Changes in ρ on y¯ − η
b. Changes in θ : Let ρ = 0.7 and η = 5. As in part (1), Di is given by the solid curve and y¯ − η is given
by the dashed curve.
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Eﬀect on D∗ of changes in θ
Since D∗ > 0, θ > 3.387, and D = y¯− η, for θ < 6.5 and D = Di for θ > 6.5. In either case, D∗ increases
as θ increases.
c. Changes in η : Let ρ = 0.7 and θ = 4. Substituting these values in A yields A = 2.8225. Once again,
the solid curve represents Di and the dashed curve represents y¯ − η. We have also drawn the curve
representing y∗ + η, represented by the dotted curve. Recall that the existence of equilibrium requires
that y∗ + η > y¯ − η ⇒ η > 3.8346.
Thus, D∗ decreases as η increases.
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